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Enforcement of the Law in International and
Non-International Conflicts - The Way
Ahead
L. C. GREEN*
In his great work on war, Quincy Wright says comparatively little
on the law of war and virtually nothing on its breaches or enforcement.' More concerned with problems of prevention and alternatives
to war, in fact no reference to war crimes or crimes against humanity
appears anywhere in his index. Under the rubric of "law of war," the
index indicates a fairly lengthy chapter on the "theory of modern war,"
yet the mention of jus in bello offers no discussion. A reference to
Nuremberg in the index under "Nurnberg charter, and aggression,
1540," leads nowhere. Despite the finding by the Nuremberg Tribunal
that Hague Convention V2 constituted customary international law,'
Wright seems more concerned with the fact that the 1899 and 1907
conferences dealt with arbitration, although he does concede that "they
contributed to the codification of the law of war."
In Appendix XV, Wright draws attention to the "military characteristics of the historic civilizations," beginning with ancient Egypt and
pursuing the subject through to the nineteenth century. Still, nowhere
does he refer to the means by which these civilizations regulated the
conduct of their forces. However, after commenting upon the intense
enmity that usually accompanies ideological conflict (reverberating for
the contemporary reader in Bosnia) he points out that:
the law of war, particularly that part dealing with the conduct of
war (the jus in bello), has sought to counteract this tendency by
setting limits to the methods which may be used in order to reduce
destructiveness and to make future reconciliation possible. When
war is fought for broad, ideological objectives, such rules have tended to break down because the end is thought to justify all means
and war has tended to become absolute. Though the development of
civilization has tended to the emphasis upon such objectives in war,
it has also tended to the development of sentiments of humanity
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and more longsighted expediency. Consequently, the rise of a civilization has meant more legal regulation of war, but also more appeal to military necessity as a ground for evading such rules in
practice.6
This reference to "civilization" and the "sentiments of humanity,"
especially the current tendency to refer to the laws of armed conflict as
"international humanitarian law,"" cause one to recall the comment of
Clausewitz:
War is an act of force, there is no logical limit to the application of
force ....
Attached to force are certain self-imposed imperceptible
limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law
and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.... [In fact,] kind-hearted people might... think there was some ingenious way to disarm
or defeat an enemy without bloodshed, and might imagine that is
the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy
that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the
mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.... [However,] if civilizations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger
part in their methods of warfare [than was the case among savages] and has taught them, more effective ways of using force than
the crude expression of instinct.7
In fact, history indicates that some of the peoples that Clausewitz
would undoubtedly have described as "savages" were aware of the need
to limit the horrors of conflict and, in many instances, were prepared
to threaten punishment of those in breach of the law, even if that law
was only regarded as the law of the gods. Already in the Old Testament we find clear references to the obligation to treat both wounded
and prisoners with humanity. Thus, the Israelites were instructed,
"rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart be glad
when he stumbleth; Lest the Lord see it, and it displeases Him, and he
turn His wrath away from him."' Again, "if thine enemy be hungry,
give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink."9
But perhaps the most significant comment is to be found in the answer
given by the prophet Elisha when asked by the king whether he
should slay his prisoners: "Thou shalt not smite them: wouldest thou
smite those whom thou hast taken captive with thy sword and with
thy bow? Set bread and water before them, that they may eat and

5. Id. at 160-161.
6. BEST, WAR AND

LAW SINCE 1945 vii (1994): "The parts of international law
supposed to control and moderate [war], the Laws of War as they were formerly
known, have become, in our age, more highly developed than ever before and popu-

larly known as International Humanitarian Law."
7. VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR bk. I, ch.1,

eds., 1976).
8. Proverbs, 24, 21.
9. Proverbs, 25, 21.

9 2, 3, 75, 76 (Howard and Paret
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drink and go to their master. And he prepared great provision for
them: and when they had eaten and drunk, he sent them away and
they went to their master."' °
The sacred writings of ancient India also seek to introduce some
measure of humanitarianism. Both the Ramayana" and
Mahabharata" lay down a series of principles which have only recently become recognized as part of the modem law of armed conflict: 3
When he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with
weapons concealed in wood, nor with such as are barbed, poisoned,
or the points of which are blazing with fire. Neither poisoned nor
barbed arrows should be used. These are weapons of the wicked. A
car warrior should fight a car warrior. One on horse should fight
one on horse. Elephant riders must fight with elephant riders, as
one on foot fights a foot soldier. When the antagonist has fallen
into distress he should not be struck; brave warriors do not shoot at
one whose arrows are exhausted.14 No one should strike another
that is retreating... let him remember the duty of honourable
warriors; do not kill a man when he is down; even a wicked enemy,
if he seeks shelter, should not be slain.... Car-drivers, men engaged in the transport of weapons... should never be slain. No
one should slay him who goes out to procure forage or fodder, camp
followers or those that do menial service.' No one should kill him
that is skilled in a special art. He is no son of the Vishni race who
slayeth a woman, a boy or an old man. Let him not strike one who
has been grievously wounded. A wounded opponent shall either be
sent to his own home, or if brought to the victor's quarters, have
his wounds attended to, and when cured he shall be set at liberty.
This is eternal duty. Night slaughter [is] horrible and infamous.
With death our enmity has terminated... Customs, laws and
family usages which obtain in a country should be preserved when

10. Kings, 6, 22-23.
11. Sanskrit epic composed in 3rd century B.C.
12. Epic Sanskrit poem based on Hindu ideals, probably composed between 200
B.C. and 200 A.D.
13. The examples given are taken from Armour, Customs of Warfare in Ancient

India, 8 TRANSACTIONS OF ThE GROTIUS SOcIETY 71, 73-77, 81 (1922).
14. This should be compared with the argument put forward by Kapitanleutnant
(Ing) Lenz for his part in firing upon survivors after the sinking of The Peleus, 1
U.N. War Crimes Commission, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRLAS OF WAR CRIMINAIS 1, 3-4
(1947). A full report of the trial will be found in CAMERON, THE PELEUS TRIAL

(1948).
15. This should be compared with the statement by Fluellen at Agincourt in
1415, as reported by WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 4, scene 7, 11.5-20: "kill
the boys and take the luggage! 'is expressly against the law of arms: tis as arrant
a piece of knavery as can be offer'd" This statement was made in connection with
Henry's order to kill the French prisoners as a reprisal for the slaughter of the
'boys.* It would seem that Shakespeare based his account on Holinshed's CHRONICLES, but a somewhat different version is given by VATrEL, DROIT DES GENS, liv. III,
ch. VIII, §.152 (1758).
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the country has been acquired. Having conquered the country of his
foe, let him not abolish or disregard the laws of that country. A
king should never do such an injury to his foe as would rankle in
the latter's heart.
Perhaps the leading commentator on the international law of
classical times is Coleman Phillipson. 6 He tells us, 7 in both Hellas

and Rome, the rules of war applied only to "civilized sovereign States,
properly organized and enjoying a regular constitution; ....
[HIence
barbarians, savage tribes, bands of robbers and pirates, and the like
were debarred from the benefits and relaxations established by international law and custom." War in general practice in Hellas, recorded
in the narratives of Greek writers, wavered between brutal cruelty and
generosity:' 8
In Homer... hostilities for the most part assumed the form of
indiscriminate brigandage, and were but rarely conducted with a
view to achieving regular conquests, and extending the territory of
the victorious community. Extermination rather than subjection of
the enemy was the usual practice.... Sometimes prisoners were
sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated and mercy refused to children, and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts of mercy
and nobility were frequent.... The adoption of certain cowardly,
inhuman practices, such as, for example, the use of poisoned weapons, was condemned.
The conduct of war, Phillipson continues, was affected by the size of
these States:
Hostility against the State, in the eyes of the individual living in
such a small State, provided the glue to tie individual with country
more closely, whose subjects were to an extraordinary degree animated by patriotism and devotion to their mother-country, that every individual was more affected by hostilities than are the cities of
the large modern States, that every individual was a soldier-politician who saw his home, his life, his family, his gods, at stake, and,
finally, that he regarded each and every subject of the opposing
States as his personal enemy.... [Nevertheless,] temples, and
priests, and embassies were considered inviolable. The right of
sanctuary was universally recognized. Mercy was shown to suppliants and helpless captives. Prisoners were ransomed and exchanged. Safe-conducts were granted and respected. Truces and
armistices were established and, for the most part, faithfully observed. Solemn oaths were fulfilled. Burial of dead was permitted,

16.

PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSMM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND

ROME (1911).
17. Id. at vol. 2,
195, 207-209, 210, 221-3; See also, THUCYDIDES, THE
PELEPPONESAN WAR 79 et seq. (Hobbes trans., 1676).
18. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 34, bk. I, 11. 260-63, 221-3 (Lattimore ed.,

1965).
19. PHULLIPSON, supra note 16, at 17.
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and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious
to cut off or poison the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisoned weapons. Treacherous stratagems were condemned as being
contrary to civilized warfare. And ... it is essential to emphasize
that the non-existence of the law and universally accepted custom
relating to them is not necessarily proved when we point here and
there to conduct of a contrary nature.... [The Roman practice]
varied according as their wars were commenced to exact vengeance
for gross violations of international law or for deliberate acts of
treachery. Their warlike usages varied also according as their adversaries were regular enemies.., or uncivilized barbarians and
bands of pirates and marauders .... Undoubtedly, the belligerent
operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various
mitigations in the field, and adopting a milder policy after victory,
are distinctly of a progressive character. They were more regular
and disciplined than those of any other ancient nation. They did
not as a rule degenerate into indiscriminate slaughter and unrestrained devastation. The ius bell imposed restrictions on barba20
rism an condemned all acts of treachery .... [Livy tells us]
there were laws of war as well as peace, and the Romans had
learnt to put them into practice not less justly than bravely....
The Romans [says Cicero]" refuse to countenance a criminal attempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor...."
In classical times the only sanction for breaches of the law of war
appears to have been condemnation by the gods, although Justinian
informs us that "any person who in war commits any act forbidden by
his commander shall suffer death, even if his mission be successfully
accomplished."' A similar situation existed in Islam: the ninth century Siyar by Shaybani' bans the killing of women, children, the old,
the blind, the crippled, and the helpless insane. Muslims were under
legal obligations to respect the rights of nonMuslims, both combatants
and civilians; prisoners of war were not to be killed, but ransomed or
set free as an act of grace, although, if it were advantageous to Muslims, non-Muslim prisoners could be killed unless they converted. 2 '
Apparently, the presumption was that true believers in Islam would
comply with the teachings of the Prophet. However, Shaybani considered that if the governor of a city or province entered "the territory of
war" he was competent to impose religious penalties or retaliation in
cases of theft, adultery or fornication. However, the fact that the drinking of wine was also condemned suggests that these punishments were
not directed to the protection of victims but to the punishment of Mus-

20. Livy, 27 HISTORY OF ROME.
21. CICERO, DE OFncIs i, 11.
22. De re militari, DIGEST XLIX, title 16.
23. TH

ISLAMIc LAW OF NATIONS §§ 29-32, 47, 81, 110-111 (Khadduri trans.,

1966).
24. Id. at 13, §§ 44, 55, 95-109.
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lims breaking the laws of the faith.25
The medieval Christian church too relied on divine punishment.
As early as 1096-7 Urban II had condemned the action of crossbowmen
and archers against Christians. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council
anathematized all those using the crossbow and arc, 6 a view which
coincided with the concepts of chivalry as understood by the orders of
knighthood: such weapons could be used from a distance by an unseen
foe, including villeins, enabling a man to strike without risk of himself
being struck. As such, they were considered disgraceful." The use of
darts and catapults was similarly anathematized by the Corpus juris
canonici, 1500, "in order to reduce as far as possible the engines of
destruction and death," although by 1563 these and other weapons
capable of sending "men ... to perdition by the hundreds" were in
common use.' Forces of Bologna in 1439, using a new handgun, shot
down a number of plate-armoured Venetians, provoking such feelings
among the Venetians as to their opponents' disregard for the game of
war that the Venetians slaughtered all prisoners "who had stooped so
low as to use this crude and cowardly innovation," i.e., gunpowder. "It
would, if unchecked, they said, make fighting a positively DANGEROUS profession."'
While the church may have relied on divine punishment, the feudal knights were aware of the "law of chivalry," a customary code of
conduct controlling their affairs and enforced either by arbitrators
especially appointed or, in the case of England and France, by Courts
of Chivalry.' In 1307, special military courts were trying allegations
of breach of parole."' The rules of chivalry only applied among the
knights, but they could be enforced by commanders of any nationality.
They were sufficiently widely known by 1370 that at the siege of
Limoges, three captured French knights appealed to John of Gaunt
and the Earl of Cambridge after the English commander issued orders
that no quarter was to be given: "My Lords we are yours, you have
vanquished us. Act therefore to the law of arms."3 Their lives were

25. Id. §§ 126-130.
26.
27.
opment
28.
(1563).

CONTAMAINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 71 (Jones trans., 1984).
Draper,The Interaction of Christiantity and Chivalry in the Historical Develof the Law of War, 5 INTL REV. RED X. 3, 19 (1965).
BELLI, DE RE MILrTARi ET BELLI I III, cap. 29, 186 (Carnegie trans., 1936)

29. TREECE AND OAKESHOTr,
THROUGH THE AGES 207-8 (1963).
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30. See, e,g., KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 27 (1965); see
also CONTAMINE, supra note 25 at 270-7; WARD, "Of the Influence of Chivalry," 2
THE FOUNDATION AND HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE ch.XIV (1795);
and Gardot, Le Doit de la Guerre dans l'Oeuvre des Capitaines Francois du XVI
Si~c/e, 72 HAGUE RECEUIL 397 (1948).
31. Keen, supra note 29, at 34.

32. Id. at 1.
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spared and they were treated as prisoners.
As has already been pointed out, by the time of Elizabeth I the
principles of the "law of arms" were so well established that Shakespeare could refer to them in his Henry V. Moreover, as early as 1391
Merigot Marches was tried at Paris for continuing to commit acts of
war after the entrance of a truce. 3 Both Edward III of England and
34
Charles VII of France issued ordinances for the trial of ecorcheurs
accused of conducting warlike acts without royal authority. 5 Perhaps
more important than these instances, however, was the trial at
Breisach in 1474 of Peter of Hagenbach. Before a tribunal made up of
representatives of the Hanseatic cities, Hagenbach was tried for having administered occupied territory in a manner contrary to "the laws
of God and of man," and was executed regardless of his plea of obedience to the orders of his lord. 8
It was not only in international wars between, for example, England and France, that attempts were made to regulate the behavior of
the troops. Since, however, the laws of chivalry did not apply to common soldiers, their conduct could only be defined by way of national
codes which condemned particular activities against the inhabitants of
their own country, giving commanders "rights of justice" as laid down
in such codes. Among the earliest of these was that of Richard II of
England, 1385,' which forbade, among other things, pillage of the
church, victuals, provisions, or forage and provided for parole of prisoners regarded as the private property not of their captors but of the
king. This system of national regulation was facilitated by the early
fifteenth century. All men-at-arms had to be included in an official
muster, subject to a disciplinary code, including rules concerning the
taking and distribution of booty, as well as forbidding pillage and destruction of private property - particularly goods essential for husbandry. Most of such national codes postulated respect for priests,
women, children, the infirm, and the like.' French knights were adamant in protecting the modesty of women found in surrendered cities," whether in internal wars or not. By ordinance, Coligny, during
the sixteenth century Wars of Religion in France, made violence
against women punishable by death.' Respect for women was so well
established throughout Europe that, writing in 1612, Gentili could

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 97-100; further examples are given at 100, n.1.
Literally, "skinners," armed bands of free companies.
Id. at 97-100.
SCHWARZENBERGER, The Law of Armed Conflict, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW ch.

39

(1968).
37. WINTHROP, MILrrARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS app. II (1886).
38. See, e.g., Code of Gustavus Aldolphus of Sweden, 1621, Articles and Military
Lawes to be Observed in the Warres, WINTHROP supra note 37, at app. III, art.97.
39. Gardot, supra note 29, at 452-3.
40. Id. at 469.
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state that "to violate the honour of women will always be held to be
unjust," and then quoted as evidence the view of Alexander: "I am not
in the habit of warring with prisoners and women." 1
By the seventeenth century, England had a full system of Articles
of War, a set of regulations on the behavior of the armed forces which
forbade and rendered liable to trial and punishment, among other
things, the marauding of the countryside, individual acts against the
enemy without authorization from a superior, the private taking or
keeping of booty, or the private detention of an enemy prisoner.'2
Similar codes in Switzerland and Germany,' it has been said, combined with the rules of international law, to form "le meilleur frein
pratique pour imposer aux armies le respect d'un modus legitimus de
mener les guerres.""
Regulations for the conduct of war, in some instances together
with acknowledgment of the right of trial, are not only found in the
customs of the knights or the national military codes. Reference must
be made to views of at least some of the classical writers on international law,' for to the extent that they expressed commonly held
views of the time, their writings constitute evidence of customary law.
Gentili, for example, wrote:
[Un war.., victory is sought in no prescribed fashion....

Our

only precaution must be not to allow every kind of cunning device;
for evil is not lawful, but an enemy should be dealt with according

to law....

In dealing with a just and lawful enemy [as distinct

from pirates and brigands] we have the whole fetial law and many
other laws in common.... Necessity does not oblige us to violate

the rights of our adversaries... [but t]he laws of war are not observed toward one who does not observe them.'
Nevertheless, he forbids the killing of those who surrender, for it is
"only when we cannot overcome their resistance and bring them to
terms by less severe means, [that] we are justified in taking away
their lives."' He condemns the denial of quarter, reprisals against
prisoners, and violence against women, children, the aged and the sick,
ecclesiastics and men of letters, husbandman, and generally all un-

41. 2 DE JURE BELLI cap. xxi, at 257, 251 (Carnegie trans., 1933).
42. Laws and Ordinances of Warre, reprinted in 1 CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF
THE CROWN app. VI (1639).
43. Gardot, supra note 29, at 467-68.
44. de Taube, L'apport de Byzance au developpernent du droit international occidental, 67 HAGUE REcunL. 237 (1939).
45. This is the term usually given to the European writers of the fifteenth to
seventeenth century, especially those published in the series of the Carnegie Foundation known as THE CLAssics OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

46. See generally, 3 DE JURE BELLI cap. XVII, XVIII 216-40 (Carnegie trans.)
(1612).
47. Id.
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armed persons. Equally to be condemned are assassination, the use of
poison and poisoned weapons, and the poisoning of streams, springs,
and wells.'
Gentili's comments should be compared with those of Grotius,
commonly - but wrongly - described as "the father of international
law," who tends to be somewhat self-contradictory: "[Bly the Law of
Nations any Thing done against an Enemy is lawful; ....
It is lawful
for an Enemy to hurt another both in Person and Goods... [a]nd for
both sides without Distinction [including killing women, infants and
even prisoners], but it is restrained more or less in some Places by the
particular Law of each State."' Use of poison is unlawful, including
the poisoning of rivers and springs, though not their pollution. Later,
when discussing Moderation concerning the Right of Killing Men in a
Just War,' he quotes Cicero's view that "there are certain Duties to
be observed even to those who have wronged us,"" so that women,
children, old men, priests, and other religious should be spared. "[T]o
these we may justly add those who apply themselves to the Study of
Sciences and Arts beneficial to mankind," as well as farmers, prisoners, and those who surrender.52 Finally, he calls for avoidance of useless fighting, as a show of strength rather than a true warlike action is
"wholly repugnant to the Duty of a Christian, and Humanity itself.
Therefore all Magistrates ought strictly to forbid these Things, for they
must render an account for the unnecessary shedding of Blood to him,
whose Viceregents they are. " '
Of particular importance, the man in the field, as a participant in
a public matter, was banned from acting as if the conflict were a private affair. For example, he may not keep captured property for himself, nor commit warlike acts after a retreat or armistice." Moreover,
[Ilt is not enough that we do nothing against the Rules of rigorous
Justice, properly, so called; we must also take Care that we offend
not against Charity, especially Christian Charity. Now this may
happen sometimes; when, for Instance, it appears that such a plundering doth not so much hurt the State, or the King, or those who
are culpable themselves, but rather the Innocent, whom it may
render so extremely miserable.... But, further, if the taking of
this Booty neither contributes to the finishing of the War, nor considerably weaken the Enemy, the Gain arising to himself only from
the Unhappiness of the Times, would be highly unbecoming an

48.
49.
trans.,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. §§ 139, 140, 142, 145-7, 155-7, 280-3, 287, 289.
3 DE JuRE BELUI AC PACIS cap IV, §§. xviii, ix, x, xv, xvi, xix (Carnegie
654, 648, 649, 651, 657) (1625).
Id. at cap. XI.
DE OFICIIS, cap. XI, §§ ix-xv (trans., at 630, 720).
Id. at lib. III, cap. XI, §§. ix-xv (trans., at 640-6; 736-40).
Id. § xix (trans., at 649; 673).
Id. at cap. XVIII, § i (trans., at 684-5; 788-9).
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honest Man, much more a Christian.... Yet, if a Soldier, or any
other Person, even in a just War, shall burn the Enemy's House,
lay waste their fields, and commit such other Acts of Hostility,
without any Command, and besides when there is no Necessity, or
just Cause, in the Opinion of the Divines he stands obliged to make
Satisfaction for those Damages. I have with Reason added... if
there be not a just Cause, for if there be, he may perhaps be answerable for it to his own State, whose orders he hath transgressed, but not to his Enemy, to whom he hath done no wrong.'
Writing a century later, and with greater knowledge of actual
state practice, Vattel comments:
Since the object of a just war is to overcome injustice and violence,
and to use force upon who is deaf to the voice of reason, a sovereign
has the right to do to his enemy whatever is necessary to weaken
him and disable him from maintaining his unjust position; and the
sovereign may choose the most efficacious and appropriate means
to accomplish this object, provided those means be not essentially
unlawful, and consequently forbidden by the Law of Nations. A
lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary
to attain that end. Whatever is done in excess of such measures is
contrary to the natural law, and must be condemned as evil before
the tribunal of conscience.... [Ailso it is very difficult sometimes
to form a just estimate of what the actual situation demands, and,
moreover, as it is for each Nation to determine what its particular
circumstances warrant it in doing, it becomes absolutely necessary
that Nations should mutually conform to certain rules on this subject. Thus, when it is clear and well recognized that such a measure, such an act of hostility, is, in general, necessary for overcoming the resistance of the enemy and attaining the object of a lawful
war, that measure, viewed thus in the abstract, is regarded by the
Law of Nations as lawful and proper in war, although the belligerent who would make use of it without necessity, when less severe
measures would have answered his purpose, would not be guiltless
before God and in his own conscience. This is what constitutes the
difference between what is just, proper, and irreprehensible in war,
and what is merely permissible and may be done by Nations with
impunity.'
It is Vattel who of the classical writers, most directly seeks to
restrain the horrors of war. Necessity, providing the only justification
for war, also prescribes the limits on it. Unnecessary acts of hostility
are unjustifiable violations of natural law. Thus, Vattel advocates the
elaboration of a set of general rules, "independent of circumstances and
of certain and easy application," limiting acts to those necessary to
successful prosecution of war:

55. Id. §§ iv, v (trans., at 686; 790-1).
56. 3 LE DRorr DEs GENs ch. VIII, §§ 138, 137 (Carnegie trans., 180, 179)

(1758); see also, RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAws IN THE ENUGHTENMENT 245-56 (1975).
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Thus, it is not, generally speaking, contrary to the laws of war to
plunder and lay waste to a country. But if an enemy of greater
superior forces should treat in this way a town or province which
he might easily have held possession of, as a means of obtaining
just and advantageous terms of peace, he would be universally
accused of waging war in a barbarous and uncontrolled manner.
The deliberate destruction of public monuments, temples, tombs,
statues, pictures, etc., is, therefore, absolutely condemned even by
the voluntary Law of Nations, as being under no circumstances
conducive to the lawful object of war. The pillage and destruction of
towns, the devastation of the open country by fire and sword, are
acts no less to be abhorred and condemned on all occasions when
they are committed without evident necessity or urgent reasons.
But as an attempt might be made to excuse these excesses, as being a punishment merited by the enemy, let us add that by the
natural and voluntary Law of Nations only the most serious offenses against the Law of Nations may be punished in this manner."7
It is interesting to note that while Vattel condemns a variety of
acts as contrary to the law of nations and refers to punishment for
such acts, he does not indicate how such punishment is to be meted
out. However, he does record one instance when even death may be
imposed as a punishment:
[Wlhen the enemy have rendered themselves guilty of some grave
violation of the Law of Nations, and especially when they have violated the laws of war. Such a refusal to spare their lives is not a
natural consequence of the war, but a punishment for their crime,
punishment which the injured party has a right to inflict. But in
order that the punishment may be just, it must fall upon those who
are guilty. When a sovereign is at war with a savage nation which
observes no rules and never thinks of giving quarter he may punish
the Nation in the person of those whom he captures (for they are
among the guilty), and by such severity endeavor to make them
observe the laws of humanity; but in all cases where severity is not
absolutely necessary mercy should be shown.M
Not until the nineteenth century was a code of field army conduct
promulgated, specifying the nature of offenses and providing for trial
and punishment. Formally this code was directed at conduct during a
non-international conflict; however, its provisions were considered to
be of general application, whatever the form of armed conflict involving forces of the issuing state, and it rapidly became a model for the
armed forces of a variety of other countries, serving as the inspiration
for a series of international instruments. The Code in question was
prepared by Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia University and was
promulgated as law by President Lincoln in 1863 during the American

57. Id. at ch. VIII, § 156, ch. IX, §§ 172-3 (trans., at 289, 294-5).
58. Id. at §§ 140-1 (trans., at 280) (emphasis added).
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Civil War.' According to the Code:
[Mlilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge.... [Tihe
unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as
much as the exigencies of war will admit .... [Pirotection of the
inoffensive citizen of the hostile country is the rule. The United
States acknowledge and protect, in hostile country occupied by
them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of
the inhabitants, especially those of women: and the sacredness of
domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country... all robbery... or sacking, even after taking the
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death.... Crimes
punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, assaults,
highrobbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed
by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants,
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death
is not inflicted, the severer penalty shall be preferred.'
Regulations were laid down regarding the rights of prisoners of war as
well as the rights of protected persons, such as medical and religious
personnel. There was even some recognition of the right to punish
prisoners for what are now generally regarded as war crimes."
The rules proposed by Lieber were so consistent with what was
generally accepted as the code of conduct that similar instruments
were soon issued by Prussia, 1870; The Netherlands, 1871; France
1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; Servia, 1878; Argentina, 1881; Great
Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.62 However, there was no
internationally accepted document setting out the rules governing
warfare acceptable to the European states, the United States, or the
newly independent states of Latin America. Nevertheless, to the extent
that they express agreement, the rules to be found in these and later
national codes or in the writings of acknowledged international authorities constitute the customary international law of armed conflict. To
the extent that they have not been overruled by treaty or expressly
rejected by a state - especially a significant military power - they
are as obligatory as any other rules of international law.
The nineteenth century saw a few attempts at regulating warlike

59. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, 24 Apr. (1863); SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 3
(1988); see also, Baxter, The First Modern Codification of the Law of War, 3 INVL
REV. RED X. 171 (1963).

60. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
arts. 16, 2, 37, 44, 47 (emphasis added).

61. Id. art. 59.
62. HOLLAND, THE LAw OF WAR ON LAND 72-3 (1908).
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activities by way of international treaty," but none of these contained
clauses relating to breaches nor made provision for their punishment.
The first document to move in this direction was the Project of an
International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,
drawn up at the Brussels Conference called by the Czar in 1874."
Although this Project was never adopted as a binding statement of
law, it served as an inspiration for later developments and as a model
for the Preambular ideals ultimately embodied in binding documents.
From the point of view of law enforcement, it merely declared in Articles 12 and 13 that belligerents did not possess an unlimited power in
their choice of methods of warfare and especially forbade acts which
had already been condemned in sources such as Vattel and the Lieber
Code. The Brussels Declaration inspired the Institute of International
Law to produce the Oxford Manual on the Laws of War clarifying the
rationale behind the propagation of a code of law for armed conflict. Its
Preface merits reproduction:
War holds a great place in history, and it is not to be supposed that
men will soon give it up - in spite of the protests which it arouses
and the horror which it inspires - because it appears to be the
only possible issue of disputes which threatens the existence of
States, their liberty, their vital interests. But the gradual improvement in customs should be reflected in the method of conducting
war. It is worthy of civilized nations to seek "to restrain the destructive force of war, while recognizing its inevitable necessities."
The problem is not easy of solution; however, some points have
already been solved, and very recently the draft Declaration of
Brussels has been a solemn pronouncement of good intentions of
governments in this connection. It may be said that independently
of the international law existing on this subject, there are today
certain principles of justice which guide the public conscience,
which are manifested even by general customs, but which it would
be well to fix and make obligatory.... The Institute does not propose an international treaty, which it might perhaps be premature
or at least very difficult to obtain; but it believes it is fulfilling a
duty in offering to the governments a Manual suitable as the basis
for national legislation in each State, and in accordance with the
provisions of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies.
Rash and extreme rules will not be found therein. The Institute has
not sought innovations in drawing up the Manual; it has contented
itself with stating clearly and codifying the accepted ideas of our
age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable. By so
doing, it believes it is rendering a service to military men themselves. In fact so long as the demands of opinion remain indeterminate, belligerents are exposed to painful uncertainty and to end-

63. See, eg. Declaration of Paris, 1856, re maritime warfare; Geneva Convention,
1864, re wounded in armies in the field, 1864; Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868,
re lightweight explosive bullets, etc.
64. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 25.
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less accusations. A positive set of rules .. if they are judicious,
serves the interest of belligerents and is far from hindering them,
since by preventing the unchaining of passion and savage instinctswhich battle always awakens, as much as it awakens courage and
manly virtue -it strengthens the discipline which is the strength of
armies; it also ennobles that patriotic mission in the eyes of the
soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the
rights of humanity. But in order to attain this end, it is not sufficient for sov-ereigns to promulgate new laws. It is essential, too,
that they make these laws known among all people, so that when a
war is declared, the men called upon to take up arms to defend the
causes of the belligerent States, may be thoroughly impregnated
with the special rights and duties attached to the execution of such
a command ....

The Manual spelled out a series of specific rules, some of which
are relevant to the problem of enforcing the law: acts of violence are
limited to the forces of belligerent states, who are bound by the laws of
war. As such, states must refrain from unnecessarily cruel and severe
acts, such as punishment of nonbelligerent populations or vanquished
or disabled belligerents, use of arms to cause "superfuous suffering,"
the advance prohibition of quarter, theft, or mutilatation of the dead
on the field of battle, and bombardment of undefended territory. Occupiers were bound to respect laws in force during peacetime. Prisoners
of war were considered as being in the hands of the occupying state
rather than the capturing corps of soldiers and as such had the right
of humane treatment under the laws of the capturing army. Punishment of prisoners was recognized in the case of escape or of offenses
against the laws of war."
From the point of view of the development of the history of attempts to deal with breaches, Part III of the Manual is significant:
Part III Penal Sanction: If any of the foregoing rules be violated,
the offending parties should be punished, after a judicial hearing,
by the belligerent in whose hands they are Therefore: Art. 84. Offenders against the laws of war are liable to the punishment speci-

fied in the penal law. This mode of repression, however, is only
applicable when the person of the offender can be secured. In the
contrary case, the criminal law is powerless ... and, if the injured

party deem the misdeed so serious in character as to make it necessary to recall the enemy to a respect for law, no clearer recourse
than a resort to reprisal remains ....

Art. 86. In grave cases in

which reprisals appear to be absolutely necessary, their nature and
scope shall never exceed the measure of the infraction of the law of
war committed by the enemy.

The penal law indicated would be the national law, for no provi-

65. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).

66. Id. arts. 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 19, 44, 61-3, 68, 70 (emphasis added).
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sion was made for any trial by any international tribunal - in fact at
that time no such tribunal was even considered as a realistic probability, nor was any obligation created for a national force to hand an accused offender to the enemy alleging an offense so that he could stand
trial before an enemy tribunal.
Although the Oxford Manual has no binding legal force, many of
its principles found their way into national military manuals. The
latest editions of such instruments warrant some mention insofar as
they reflect these principles, regardless of the fact that some of the
matters raised have now been embodied in treaty form. Thus, the
British Manual of Military Law states in its Part III on The Law of
War on Land:
The laws of war are the rules which govern the conduct of war....
They are binding not only upon States as such but also upon their
nationals and, in particular, upon the individual members of the
armed forces.... The present laws of war are the result of a slow
growth. Isolated milder practices became in the course of time usages, which at first were not accompanied by a sense of legal obligation, but which by custom (i.e., constant practice accepted as law)
and by treaties, gradually developed into legal rules.... The laws
of war consist, therefore, partly of customary rules which have
grown up in practice, and partly of written rules, that is to say,
rules which have been expressly agreed upon by governments in
international treaties and conventions ....
The development of
the law of war has been determined by three principles: first, the
principle that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and
force of any kind, to the extent necessary for the realization of the
purpose of war, that is, the complete submission of the enemy at
the earliest possible moment with the least possible expenditure of
men, resources, and money; secondly, the principle of humanity,
according to which kinds and degrees of violence which are not
necessary for the purpose of war are not permitted to a belligerent;
and, thirdly, the principle of chivalry, which demands a certain
amount of fairness in offence and defence, and a certain mutual respect between the opposing forces."7
The United States Manual on The Law of Land Warfare" is,
however, somewhat more specific in its statement of basic principles:
(a) Prohibitory Effect. The law of war places limits on the
exercise of a belligerent's power ... and requires that belligerents

refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes and that they conduct
hostilities with regard to the principles of humanity and chivalry.
The prohibitive effect of the law of war is not minimized by "military necessity" which has been defined as that principle which

67. H.M.S.O. 1958, 1-3.
68. Dept of the Army, Field Mannual 27-10 (1956).
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justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which
are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and
framed with consideration for the concept of military necessity.
(b) Binding on States and Individuals. The law of war is binding not only upon States as such but also upon individuals and, in
particular, the members of their armed forces."
Like the British Manual, this too emphasises that the law is to be
found in both treaties and custom - the "body of unwritten.., law
[which] is firmly established by the custom of nations and well defined
by recognized authorities on international law.""
The German War Book, too, after listing forbidden practices in
warfare, states that "hie who offends against any of these prohibitions
is to be held responsible therefor by the State. If he is captured he is
subject to the penalties of military law."7 '
The references to "humanity" and "chivalry" find their source in
the Preamble to the first international agreement attempting to lay
down laws for the conduct of warfare on land. In 1899, Czar Nicholas
invited the major powers to a conference at The Hague, producing Convention I respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, elaborated further by Convention IV of the Second Hague Conference in
1907." While this instrument deals with land warfare, its principles
are generally accepted as having general application, regardless of the
theatre involved. The Preamble makes clear what the purpose of the
law of war is and emphasizes that its provisions are not exclusive:
Seeing that, while seeking means to preserve peace and prevent
armed conflicts between nations, it is likewise necessary to bear in
mind the case where the appeal to arms has been brought about by
events which their care was unable to avert; Animated by the desire to serve, even in the extreme case, the interests of humanity
and the ever progressive needs of civilization; Thinking it important, wit this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war,
either with a view to defining them with greater recision or to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as
far as possible;... these provisions, the wording of which has been
inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of
conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their

69. Id. 3.
70. Id. I 4(b).
71. 1902 THE GERMAN WAR BOOK 66 (Morgan trans., 1915); DE ZAYAS, THE
WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BUREAU, 1939-1945 91 (1989); de Zayas translates this".
If he is taken prisoner, he is subject to punishment by [foreign] court-martial."

72. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 69.
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relations with the inhabitants [of occupied territory]. It has not,
however, been found possible at present to concert regulations
covering all circumstances which arise in practice; On the other
hand the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be
left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a
more complete code of the law of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them [and annexed to the
Convention and generally known as the Hague Regulations], the
inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience ....
This latter portion of the Preamble is known as the "Martens Clause"
after the Russian Foreign Minister credited with elaborating it.
A direct obligation was imposed upon the contracting powers to
"issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war
on land, annexed to the present Convention." " Moreover, and perhaps
more ground-breaking from the standpoint of law, Article 3 provides
that "[a] belligerent party which violates the said Regulations shall, if
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation for all acts committed
by persons forming part of its armed forces." There was no provision
in the Convention or Regulations for personal liability. This merely
confirmed the general principle that a party to a treaty might be
obliged to pay compensation in the event of its breach. Also consistent
with general treaty practice, the Convention included an all-participation clause whereby the provisions of the Convention and the Regulations would only apply as "between Contracting Powers, and then only
if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention." By the time of
the outbreak of the Second World War, however, it was generally accepted that the Convention and Regulations had become part of customary law and were binding in any international armed conflict regardless of whether all the belligerents were parties thereto or not. 76
Despite the absence of any treaty provision for personal liability, a
series of war crimes trials was held after the termination of hostilities.
Moreover, while the text indicates that the offenders would be mem-

73. Id. art. 1.
74. Id
75. Id. art. 2.
76. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 3. "[S]everal of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to this Convention V4 [Bly 1939 these rules laid down in
the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being

declaratory of the laws and customs of war," H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6064 65(1946); 41 AM.
J. INT'L L. 172, 248-9 (1947).
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bers of the enemy forces, it is open to any belligerent to try members of
its own forces charged with offenses against the law of war, but in
such cases the trial would be held in accordance with the terms of the
national criminal or military law. Thus, during the Boer - South
African - war, in two significant instances British courts tried members of their own forces for offenses against enemy personnel. Three
members of an Australian unit serving under Kitchener were charged
with the murder of Boer civilians, one of whom was a priest. The accused pleaded compliance with orders issued after one of their officers
had been perfidiously killed. This defense was rejected and two of the
three charged were executed. 7 Better known, since the comments by
Solomon J.P. have proven the basis for the English law on superior
orders, is R. v. Smith."8 Smith, acting on orders from his superior,
had opened fire on interned civilian Boers. The references to superior
orders merit reproduction:
It is monstrous to suppose that a soldier would be protected where
the order was grossly illegal. [But that he] is responsible if he obeys
an order that is not strictly legal is an extreme proposition which
the court cannot accept .... Especially in time of war immediate
obedience... is required .... I think it is a safe rule to lay down
that if a soldier honestly believes that he is doing his duty in obeying the commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so manifestly illegal, that he must or ought to have known that they were
unlawful, the private soldier would be protected by the orders of his
superior."'

Garner' cites a number of cases during World War I in which
French tribunals tried Germans for breaches of the law of war, but he
is primarily concerned with discussing the problem of superior orders.
Each of the cases concerned was decided in accordance with French
and not with international law. Once this defense is raised, the issue
of the liability of the superior issuing the order becomes significant.
Insofar as the superior is also head of state, his traditional immunity
from trial by an alien tribunal is involved. As early as 1815 it was
suggested that Napoleon should be brought to trial for having violated
the 1814 agreement exiling him to Elba. After his escape and return to
France where he again raised an army, he was declared by the Congress of Vienna

77. See WITTEN, SCAPEGOATS OF THE EMPIRE (1907); This is a personal account
written by the third accused. This incident and trial are the subject of the film
BREAKER MoRANT.
78. 17 S.C. 561, 567-8 (Cape of Good Hope).
79. Id. See also Comments of Israeli court in Chief Military Prosecutor v.
Malinki et al. (The Kafr Quassem case) (1958), per Halevy J., c. in A.G. Isreal v.
Eichmann (1961) 36 I.L.R. 5, 256; a full report will be found in 2 PALESTwE
Y.B.INT'L L. 69, 108 (1985).
80. GARNER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 438-39 (1920).
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to have destroyed the sole legal title upon which his existence depended... placed himself outside the protection of the law, and
manifested to the world that it can neither have peace nor truce
with him... [and placed himself] outside the civil and social relations, [so] that, as Enemy and Pertubator of the World, he has incurred liability to public vengeance."
While Bliicher would have had him shot as an "outlaw," Napoleon was
regarded "by the Powers as their Prisoner" and placed in the custody
of the British who exiled him to St. Helena.82
At the end of World War I, the Allied and Associated Powers
sought to use this as a precedent to try the Emperor of Germany. By
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William H of
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring
him the guarantees essential to the right of defense. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers:
namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy
and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the
solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of
international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment
which it considers should be imposed ....
However, the Kaiser had sought asylum in The Netherlands,
which refused to surrender him, and this provision never came to fruition. However, certain of its features require comment. First, the Kaiser was not accused of any war crimes of which the Germans might
have been responsible, nor for which evidence might have been available of his direct responsibility for having ordered their commission.
Instead, he was to be charged with "a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties," an offense which would be
difficult to define, although today it might be considered a crime
against peace in the sense of the Nuremberg Charter. Further, there
was no suggestion that the tribunal would be bound by any legal principles other than that of recognizing his right to a defense. Instead, the
tribunal was to be "guided by the highest motives of international
policy," implying that the whole process was in the nature of a political
rather than a judicial operation.
As to other alleged German war criminals, the Treaty sought their

81. Id.
82. See, U.N. WCC, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

242 (1948).
83. 112 B.F.S.P. 1; 2 Israel, MAJOR PEACE
1967 1265 (1967).
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trial in accordance with strict judicial and legal principles:
Article 228. The German Government recognizes the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of committing acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be subject to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstand-

ing any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or
in the territory of her Allies. The German Government shall hand
over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as
shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in
violation of the laws and customs of war ....
Article 229. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power. Persons guilty of criminal
acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed
of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned. In
every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.8'
The German Government refused to hand over any person so
accused, and instead brought some of them to trial before the
Reichsgericht sitting at Leipzig. However, very few trials were held
and the penalties were often little more than nominal. The
Reichsgericht dealt with such matters as the treatment of prisoners of
war ' and, more importantly, the sinking of hospital ships, ' of which
the most significant was the Llandovery Castle7 which also involved
unlawful attacks upon survivors and stands as a landmark on the law
relating to the defense of superior orders.
When World War I broke out, the Prussian authorities established
a Military Bureau of Investigation of Violations of the Laws of War "to
determine violations of the laws and customs of war which enemy
military and civilian persons have committed against the Prussian
troops, [as well as] to investigate whatever accusations of this nature
are made by the enemy against members of the Prussian Army. " '
During the War, Germany did in fact try some Allied personnel for
alleged breaches of the law. The Allied Powers maintained that these
trials were themselves war crimes, although none of the persons involved in the trials or in the subsequent executions were brought before the Leipzig or any other tribunal. This, despite the fact that the
British authorities had described the trial and execution of Captain

84. Id.
85. E.g., Heynen's Casse 2 Ann.Dig. 431 (1921); the full text of this and similar
cases will be found in H.M.S.O Cmd. 1422.
86. Id. at 429 (The Dover Case); The Llandovery Case at 436.

87. The full text of this judgment is reproduced in Cameron, The Peleus Trial,
app. IX (1948).
88. DE ZAYAS, THE WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BUREAU, 1939-1945 5 (1989).
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Fryatt - charged while in command of a merchant ship with unlawfully refusing to surrender to, and trying to ram, a German U-boat as an act of "judicial murder... an atrocious crime against the law of
nations and the usages of war .... . Similarly, no action was taken
against those involved in the execution of Nursing Sister Edith Cavell
though this was also condemned as "judicial murder.'
Between the wars various steps were taken to forbid recourse to
war, such as the League Covenant,"' which introduced the possibility
of recourse to sanctions against an aggressor, and the Pact of Paris"2
-

or the Briand-Kellogg Pact

-

by which the parties renounced war

as an instrument of national policy, but no attempt was made to suggest that resort to war would result in criminal responsibility. Likewise, neither of the Geneva Conventions drawn up in 1929 relating to
the treatment of the wounded and sick and of prisoners of war made
provision for international penal action against breaches." However,
Article 29 of the Convention on the Wounded stated that: "The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall propose to their legislatures should their penal laws be inadequate, the necessary measures
for the suppression in time of war of any act contrary to the provisions
of the present Convention;" Article 30 obligated them to inform the
Swiss government as depository of the measures taken to this end.
There is no similar provision in the Prisoners of War Convention, although the Parties "recognize that a guarantee of the regular application of the present Convention will be found in the possibility of
collaboration between the protecting Powers charged with the protection of the interests of the belligerents" who would be authorized to
visit any places in which prisoners were detained."
The problem of war crimes and their punishment, per se, did not
come up again until World War II. No sooner did war begin than both
the British and the Germans established war crimes bureaus for the
collection of evidence, as did the United States in October 1944."5
However, "it seems that during the war, Germans refrained from trying British and American prisoners for war crimes, and neither Great
Britain nor the United States tried any German prisoners for war
crimes prior to the German unconditional surrender. Evidently, neither
side wanted to give the other a reason to retaliate. However, Germany

89. GARNER, supra, note 80, at 407-13.
90. Id at vol. 2, 97-102, 104-5. She was charged while a sister in a military

hospital with having assisted Allied personnel to escape to their own lines, clearly
an offence going beyond her protected status as a nurse.
91. Treaty of Versailles, ch. I, art. 16.
92. 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57; 4 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, 2522.
93. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 325, 339.
94. Art. 86.

95. DE ZAYAS, supra note 83, at 10-12.
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did not hesitate to try prisoners of war of other nationalities," including Polish, French, and Russian.9 7
During the war, the United Nations" declared their intention to
bring offenders against the laws and customs of war to trial," including those responsible for ordering such atrocities, regardless of their
rank or governmental position. In 1945, they adopted the London
Charter for the establishment of an International Military Tribunal." This was the first attempt since Breisach in 1474 to set up an
international criminal tribunal for any purpose. Composed of judges
from France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, it was granted jurisdiction over crimes against peace, namely:
the planning or waging of aggressive war; war crimes in the traditional sense of that term; and crimes against humanity committed against
any civilian population, including nationals of the offending power,
whether committed before or during the war, so long as such offenses
were "in execution' of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal." This radically reduced the scope of the concept, even though the Charter provided that crimes against humanity
included "persecution on political or religious grounds.""° ' The Charter also made clear that the status of the accused would not grant him
any immunity, even though this might have been his right under ordinary customary law. Finally, since the easiest defense that may be put
forward by one accused of war crimes is compliance with orders, the
Charter specified that this would constitute no defense, although it
might serve to mitigate punishment.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was responsible for the trial of the Major German War Criminals - that is to say,
those whose offenses were so extensive that their exact geographical
location could not be specified with any certainty. A similar tribunal
was established for the Far East, while a number of allied countries
held trials of their own, in which some of the accused possessed the
nationality of the trying authority or of its allies. Although these latter
courts were national tribunals, for the main part they did apply the
international rules relating to the conduct of hostilities. It is not necessary for our purpose to examine the variety of trials held or the nature
of the crimes alleged or defenses put forward. It suffices to refer to the
General Assembly's Resolution Affirming the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 2 the

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-103.
Name of the anti-Axis alliance during WWII.
E.g., Moscow Declaration, 1943, UNWCC, supra note 79, at 107.

100. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 911.
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subsequent statement of Principles of International Law Recognized in
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal adopted by the International Law Commission in 1950."~s
This Statement was to some extent general in character since Principle
I stated that "any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to
Punishment." It also made clear that the fact that internal law did not
criminalize a particular act would not excuse liability if that act was
criminal under international law. It confirmed the non-immunity of a
head of state or government and denied the defense of superior orders
"provided a moral choice" was open to the accused. It then guaranteed
all accused the right to a fair trial and reproduced the definition of
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity detailed in the London Charter, although in the latter case the reference
to crimes committed "in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" was changed to "in execution of
or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime." Finally, it declared that "complicity in the commission of a crime against
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity... is a crime under
international law." The Commission did not make any provision in this
instrument for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal,
although it expended a great deal of time and energy seeking to elaborate a code of crimes against peace and security, which did not reach
fruition until 1991,1 followed in 1994 by a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.1 °5
Apart from these developments arising directly from the
Nuremberg Judgment, the field of treaty law has seen certain advances relevant to the enforcement of armed conflict law. First, in 1948, the
General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention"° which has
been ratified or acceded to by the vast majority of states. Article 1
confirms that "genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time
of war, is a crime under international law which [the parties) undertake to prevent and punish." No attempt is made to place offenders
under the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, although it is recognized that a competent tribunal, might subsequently be established. In
the meantime, "persons charged with genocide... shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed."'" Since genocide is directed at the destruction "in whole
or in part, [of] a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,"
it is not a crime likely to be committed as a matter of private enter-

103. 2 Y.B.I.L.C. 374 (1950); SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at
104. 30 I.L.M. 1504.
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105. 33 I.L.M. 258.
106. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.NT.S. 27; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 231.
107. Id. art. 6.
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prise. There may also be some doubt whether a country in which it has
been committed is likely to institute proceedings therefor against its
own military or political leadership. In the conflict in Bosnia during
1993 and 1994, there were constant complaints that the various parties involved were indulging in policies of "ethnic cleansing" - apparently a more acceptable term than genocide - with the intention of
removing whole groups of people from particular districts. However,
the International Court of Justice has held that, though the purpose of
such a policy might be to extinguish the presence of a specific group in
the territory, the Convention does not include as genocide "the disappearance of a State as a subject of international law or a change in its
constitution or its territory.""°
However, since genocide is a crime that can be committed in peace
or war, there is no doubt that if committed in an international armed
conflict, genocide would certainly amount to a war crime and probably
also to a crime against humanity. If committed in a non-international
armed conflict, it would amount to a crime against humanity. True,
the absence of any international war crimes or criminal tribunal renders it somewhat unlikely that the offender would be tried or punished
by the authority of the state concerned, unless he were a rebel captured by the government or a government representative captured by
the rebels. On the other hand, if genocide amounts to a war crime,
then, in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction over
such offenses, the offender could be tried by any country in which he
might be found. In the case of the former Yugoslavia this problem has
been met by the decision of the Security Council 9 to establish an ad
hoc tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.
More pertinent to the law of armed conflict as such are the 1949
Geneva Conventions"' and the amending Protocols of 1977."'
There are two major innovations in the 1949 Conventions that merit
comment. First, Article 3 is common to all four instruments. For the
first time an international agreement relating to armed conflict law
has attempted to extend its purview to "an armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High

108. Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia

[Serbia and Montenegro]), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 345.
109. U.N. SCOR, Res. 827 (1993); 32 I.L.M. 1203-the Statute of the Tribunal, as

proposed by the Secretary General, is at 1170.
110. I-Wounded and Sick in the Field; II-Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea;
III-Prisoners of War;, IV-Civilians; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 373, 401,
423, 495.
111. I-Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts; H-Protection of Victims in Non-International Armed Conflicts; SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at
621, 689.
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Contracting Parties."" This seeks to limit the scope of the conflict by
protecting those who are civilians or hors de combat by providing for
the collection and care of the wounded and sick and by expressly providing that:
IT]he following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating
and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized persons.
However, the Conventions do not contain any suggestion that a
breach of these principles by either the government or the revolutionary forces would amount to a war crime, as the Article makes it clear
that "the application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict." There is, therefore, nothing
to stop the authorities from treating captured rebels as traitors and,
provided that the normal judicial guarantees are applied, it would still
be possible to try such persons before a military tribunal so long as it
has been "regularly constituted." It is difficult to determine how members of the government forces in breach of the safeguards laid down in
the Article would be rendered liable to prosecution. This would clearly
depend on the goodwill of the government concerned and the provisions of the national criminal and military law. It is also difficult to
perceive how any international judicial tribunal would find a Party in
breach of Article 3 if the complaint were lodged by another Party not
party to the conflict and which had suffered no direct damage from the
breach in question.
Second, and perhaps far more significant, each of the Conventions
contains provisions with regard to the repression of abuses and infractions, for observation and enforcement," as well as for the establishment of an inquiry procedure concerning any alleged violation. Each
obligates the Parties:
... to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal

sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches committed in the following Article. Each High
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
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and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case. Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of acts contrary to the provisions of the present
Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following
Article. In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by
safeguards of proper trial and defense, which shall not be less favorable than those provided by Article 105 and those following in
the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War ....
The grave breaches listed in the Convention remain war crimes
since they are breaches of treaty law relating to the conduct of armed
conflict. However, the fact that a traditional war crime has not been
included in the list does not mean that such offense - for example,
denial of quarter or use of poison - has ceased to be considered a
breach of the law of war. Persons accused thereof may still be tried as
war criminals. As defined in the most comprehensive list, found under
the Civilians Convention, grave breaches:
shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction
and expropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
It is important to note that both "inhuman treatment" and "great suffering" are likely to be difficult to define: the victim's view will probably be very different from that of the accused or perhaps even of the
tribunal.
Once again the issue of trial and punishment was left to the national court, although universal jurisdiction was now recognized to exist at least among the parties to the Conventions, while it was accepted that for various reasons a holding country might prefer to transfer
the accused for trial elsewhere provided the court seeking to try him
could present a prima facie case. The Conventions are general in character and apply to all personnel participating in a conflict regardless of
nationality. Thus, it is open to a holding country to try its own nationals for breaches of the Conventions, although the general practice
would be to enact legislation giving statutory effect to the Conventions.
This means that in such cases the trial would proceed under national
law and might make no reference whatever to the Geneva Conventions. Until the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda, no attempt was made
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to prosecute any accused for any sort of war crime as defined either in
the Conventions or in customary law. However, in Vietnam, the United
States did try a number of its own personnel for offenses which the lay
person or the media would describe as war crimes although charges
were brought under the Code of Service Discipline."" Similarly, the
charges of murder and torture against Canadian personnel serving as
United Nations peace-keepers in Somalia in 1994 were under the National Defence Act and the Criminal Code.'15
It is not unusual for those accused of war crimes to plead compliance with their own national law. To some extent the Convention provision prevents this by forbidding each party "to absolve itself or any
other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by
any other High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to1A. "
This indicates that not only is the local law defense excluded, but parties are unable to agree among themselves whether to ignore a breach
or to enter into any agreement excusing breaches committed inter se.
The next major development in treaty law came in 1977 with the
adoption of the Protocols additional to the 1949 Conventions. It is only
Protocol I relating to international armed conflict that contains any
provisions concerning enforcement of the law. Section II of Protocol I,
Articles 85-91, is concerned with Repression of Breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.'16 In the first place the Section makes
it clear that it relates not only to grave breaches but to other breaches
as well. It then proceeds to expand the list of grave breaches found in
the Conventions; it specifically states that "without prejudice to the
application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of
these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes.""' This merely
means that while all grave breaches are in fact war crimes, not all war
crimes are grave breaches." The additional breaches mentioned in
the Protocol are, of course, subject to the penal provisions to be found
in the Conventions.
Having spelled out what constitutes grave breaches, the Protocol
indicates the measures necessary to repress them and to suppress all
other breaches of the Conventions and Protocol, thus again confirming
that all breaches are punishable. For the first time since Hague Convention IV provided for the financial liability of a state whose nationals were in breach of the Regulations, Article 86 of the Protocol

114. See e.g., U.S. v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108 (1969) ; US. v. Griffin, id. at 586;
U.S. v. Callrey, 46 C.M.R. 1131. 48 (1969/71, 1973); id. at 19; 1 Mil. Law. Reporter
2488; see also, Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974).
115. The reports in these cases have not yet become available, although one soldier was sentenced to five years for manslaughter and an officer was reprimanded.
116. SCHINDLER AND TOMAN, supra note 2, at 671-5.
117. Id.
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strengthens the punitive provisions of the Conventions and emphasizes
the liability of a "superior" for any breach by a subordinate, if the
superior "knew, or had information which should have enabled [him] to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that [the subordinate] was
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if [the superior]
did not take all feasible measures within [his] power to prevent or
repress the breach."
It is unfortunate that the Canadian courts martial arising from
the activities of peace-keepers in Somalia did not pay sufficient respect
to this provision or realize that its principles were of general application with regard to the ordinary service responsibilities of military
superiors, be they senior or non-commissioned officers.
In fact, Article 87 spells out the duty of commanders, obligating
all parties to the Conventions, Protocol, or conflict to
require military commanders to prevent and, where necessary, to
suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches [committed by anyone under their command] (and i~n order to prevent and
suppress breaches [all parties] shall require that, commensurate
with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members

of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol ... [and] any commander who is aware that [any] persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach [shall] initiate such
steps as are necessary to prevent such violations and, where appropriate, initiate disciplinary or penal sanctions against violators
thereof.

The Protocol proceeds to make provision for cooperation in criminal enforcement among the parties, including extradition where apposite. In all cases, however, reserving obligations ensuing from any
other treaty concerning criminal cooperation, "the law of the 1/ Party
requested shall apply in all cases." Finally, from this point of view, the
parties have undertaken to act individually or jointly in the event of
serious violations, in cooperation with the United Nations and in conformity with the Charter. This development has acquired practical
significance with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the
prosecution of crimes against international humanitarian law perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Perhaps surprisingly, in view of the emphasis on the responsibility of the commander and the earlier provision for personal liability on
the part of the actual offender, no mention exists in the Protocol either
of the defense of superior orders or, despite the right of an accused to a
fair trial, to his right to employ any of the defenses recognized by international law, including this defense even if only by way of mitigation of sentence.
It remains necessary to mention two other developments signifi-
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cant from the point of view of securing observance as distinct from
enforcement of the law of armed conflict.
By Article 90 an International Fact-Finding Commission is appointed, whose task is to "enquire into any facts alleged to be a grave
breach as defined in the Conventions and this Protocol or other serious
violation [thereof and] to facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol."
Most modern armed forces have legal advisers available at least
to the most senior officers. These advisers will probably have access to
military manuals. Until 1977 there was no requirement in international law for this to be the case. By Article 82 of Protocol I, parties to the
Protocol as well as parties to the conflict "shall ensure that legal advisers are available, when necessary, to advise military commanders at
the appropriate level on the application of the Conventions and this
Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to be given to the armed
forces on this subject." While it does not state the level of command at
which advisers should be available, this provision does mean that in
the event a commander should disregard the advice given him, it will
be exceedingly difficult for him to argue at any subsequent penal or
administrative proceeding that he was unaware of the legal position.
This provision has had its effect in practice: during the Gulf War of
1991, many of the vessels involved in patrolling the seas had such
personnel attached to them; General Powell, US Army Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in his Report to Congress stated that "[dlecisions were
impacted by legal considerations at every level, the law of war proved
invaluable in the decision-making process.""
With the exception of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Conventions, prior to 1977 no international legal regulation relative to the
conduct of non-international conflicts existed, nor did any legal - as
distinct from moral - process for dealing with atrocities exist. In this
regard, in a recognized state of belligerency the international law of
armed conflict would apply. In 1977, however, acknowledging that
many conflicts previously considered to be non-international were now,
for political reasons, regarded as "just" wars, Protocol I raised to the
level of international armed conflicts with all laws and regulations
relevant thereto, those "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racial
regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination.""9 In
practice, this provision has tended to remain somewhat of a dead letter.
The provisions in the Conventions and Protocol clearly relate to a
conflict in progress or the trial of those accused of offenses and in the

119. App. 0. 1, 31 I.L.M. 615.
120. Art. 1 (4).

DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 24:2,3

hands of an adverse party or of a state in which they have sought
refuge and asylum. Some countries, including Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom, have amended their criminal law to give jurisdiction to their courts over persons found within their territory and accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, particularly when
such crimes were alleged to have been committed during WW II. However, the fate of the trials instituted under such legislation has not
been promising."' In addition, arising from the conflicts in Ethiopia,
Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, and those resulting from a variety of
coups and consequential civil wars, successor governments have begun
to try their defeated opponents for offenses which many might regard
as treasonable or common crimes, including murder and torture, but
which the present authorities tend to condemn as war crimes or crimes
against humanity.
Protocol 1II' aimed at supplementing common Article 3 and, for
the first time, at introducing by way of treaty some measure of legal
restraint into non-international armed conflicts. However, the Protocol
may be ignored for our purpose since it contains no provisions relating
to offenses, breaches, or punishment. Moreover, the provision relating
to dissemination is much weaker and less significant than that found
in Protocol I. Article 83 of the latter obligates the parties, in time of
peace and of war, to disseminate the Conventions and Protocol as
widely as possible, requiring their study in military instruction courses, while encouraging the civilian population to similar study. Further,
it provides that civilian and military personnel who may be called
upon to administer the Conventions and Protocol in time of conflict
should be fully acquainted with their texts, thus decreasing the likelihood of breaches. Article 19 of Protocol II, on the other hand, merely
provides that its terms should be disseminated as widely as possible,
imposing no obligation of any kind either in regard to the civilian or
military personnel of a party.
Although Protocol II lacks any enforcement or punitive procedure,
to some extent the Security Council of the United Nations has in recent years sought to fill these lacunae. It has done this by way of extensive interpretation of its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter
relating to action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression. In its early years, the Council reserved
its enforcement procedures for conflicts which could be described as
international; as time passed it seemed prepared to act even in instances when such classification could only be termed political rather
than legal. Encouragement to operate in this way was, to some extent,
based on the human rights provisions in the Charter, the Universal
Declaration, and the Covenants on Human Rights. Article 2, para-
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graph 7, of the Charter precludes the Organization from interfering in
any matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, unless there is a need to resort to enforcement measures under Chapter
VII. It could hardly be said that the policy of apartheidpursued by the
former Government of South Africa constituted any threat to the peace
by that government. Nevertheless, from as early as 1961, complaints
against this policy arose in the Council, and in 1977 the Security
Council determined, "having regard to the policies and acts of the
South African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of
arms and related mathriel constitutes a threat to the maintenance of
internationalpeace and security, [and decided] that all States shall
cease forthwith any provision of arms and related matkriel of all
types."' Some countries enacted legislation making it an offense for
their citizens to breach this embargo, which was later extended to
cover sporting relations and other activities, including the denial of
South Africa's right to exercise its rights as a member of the United
Nations.
It is difficult other than by way of Orwellian diplomatic doubletalk to envisage, how the South African policy of apartheid, or the exports of defensive arms to the South African Government, would have
threatened any other state. The only manner in which the situation
could be brought within the purview of Chapter VII and out of the domestic jurisdiction reservation was by assuming that continuance of
apartheid, against persons they regarded as ethnically related, would
so enrage the newly-independent African neighbors of the Republic
that one or other of them might be provoked into launching an armed
attack. While, normally, one would expect the attacker to be condemned under Chapter VII, by reason of international political correctness it could be argued that the refusal to abandon apartheid itself
constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace since it
was likely to provoke an armed attack which the majority of the members of the United Nations would consider just. Eventually, the General Assembly adopted a Convention' condemning apartheid as an international crime, although no attempt was ever made to indict any
politician, South African or otherwise. This offense has now been elevated by the International Law Commission to the level of a crime
against international peace and security. 25
In this case one can find by extensive interpretation that the
Council was correct in its assertions. However, in other cases the situation is more difficult. Traditionally, a civil war or a non-international
123. S.C.Res. 418, U.N. SCOR (1977) reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1548 (emphasis added).
124. GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974).
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armed conflict has been considered as essentially domestic. In customary law, intervention by outsiders has been considered improper, although history during the last 150 years or so presents numerous
instances of third states putting forward a variety of excuses to justify
interference. Nevertheless, in none of these cases has there been any
suggestion that the international law of armed conflict was applicable
or that those accused of atrocities during the conflict should be brought
to trial in accordance with international legal rules or procedures. The
only means of punishing such offenses has been by the municipal law
of the state involved or in accordance with the new law established by
successful revolutionaries.
However, world public opinion has become revolted by the atrocities committed during non-international conflicts in such places as
Kampuchea (Cambodia), Somalia, Ethiopia, Haiti, and Bosnia, among
others. Responding to this opinion, the Security Council has been prepared to authorize some measure of interference, usually through the
medium of groups of "peace-keepers" specially contributed by member
states. In two instances, the Security Council has gone so far as to
take positive punitive action against those involved in such outrageous
behavior, hoping that the institution of criminal proceedings, especially
while the conflict is in progress, will inhibit the commission of further
atrocities and vindicate the rule of armed conflict law. To this end, the
Council has not been over-scrupulous in identifying the conflict as
international or non-international. However, by authorizing action
against crimes against international humanitarian law, it avoids this
complex legal issue: it is not difficult to argue that any such crime,
regardless of the applicability of the Geneva law commonly described
as international humanitarian law,' is in itself a crime against humanity, while offenses which amount to war crimes - particularly
those of a serious character - equally fall into such a classification.
From 1991 on, reports surfaced of atrocities and other breaches of
international humanitarian law, including "ethnic cleansing" committed in the conflicts raging in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this territory there was, at least in the early
days, both an international conflict involving Bosnia, Serbia and
Croatia, together with a series of internal conflicts affecting the various ethnic groups within Bosnia. More recently this seems to have become exclusively a non-international conflict waged by Croatian and
Bosnian Serbs, together with some dissident Muslims against the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was primarily Muslim in char-
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acter. As a result of these reports, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions condemning these activities, imposing an arms embargo upon all parties and authorizing the dispatch of "peace-keepers"
whose mission was to be humanitarian in character and would include
the establishment of United Nations safe areas for the protection of
civilians. As a result of continuing reports of breaches of international
humanitarian law, in 1992 the Security Council appointed an International Commission of Experts "to examine and analyze" all information
concerning such incidents, as well as conducting its own investigations,
"with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on
the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia." 7 Finally, acting on the recommendation
of the Secretary General"u that, in the light of continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law,
the situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, established an international tribunal for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in that territory."
The Tribunal was given competence to deal with such violations
as might have occurred since the beginning of the conflicts in 1991,
and its jurisdiction extended over "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; violations of the laws and customs of war; genocide
and crimes against humanity." The persons amenable to its jurisdiction were those planning, ordering, committing, or aiding and abetting
the planning, preparation, or execution of such crimes, whose personal
liability therefore was reaffirmed, with official status not providing any
immunity. Further, the responsibility of a commander and the nonapplicability of the defense of superior orders were confirmed. It is
clear, therefore, that insofar as jurisdiction and competence are concerned, the Statute reflects the developments since the end of World
War II, based on the provisions in the 1949 Conventions, Protocol I,
and the Nuremberg Principles. However, unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal, this Tribunal does not possess competence to try an accused in
absentia. While the principle non-bis-in-idem is confirmed, the International Tribunal enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, but
possesses primacy so that it may "formally request national courts to
defer to [its] competence," as it has successfully done with regard to an
accused found in Germany, where he was indicted before a local court.
When similar evidence was made available as to events occurring
during the civil war in Rwanda, the Council decided to establish a
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separate tribunal for those charged in connection therewith, although
the personnel constituting this latter Tribunal would be drawn from
the members of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
If the various groups and governments involved in the hostilities
in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda would agree to transfer those
accused to stand trial before these Tribunals, their activities might
well rank with those of the Nuremberg Judgment. In fact, their jurisprudence might even stand higher since they have been established
not by a group of victors consequent upon the defeat of an enemy but
by authority of the United Nations without the groups or states involved having any part in the decision. However, it soon became evident that, for example, the Serb elements in Bosnia would not be willing to hand over any of their supporters regardless of the evidence
against them, despite reports that some of the groups involved in the
conflict have on occasion brought alleged offenders to trial before their
own tribunals. Similarly, in the case of Rwanda the newly established
government announced its intention to institute its own war crimes
trials even though an International Tribunal for this territory exists. A
similar situation has arisen in Ethiopia, where the successful revolutionary government has instituted against supporters of the overthrown revolutionary or legitimate regime a series of trials described
as being for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Such national
processes raise the question whether the trials in issue are directed
more at political vengeance than at the punishment of war crimes or
crimes against humanity, having occurred during a non-international
conflict. At the same time, and more significantly, some European
countries, having found alleged offenders among refugees from Yugoslavia, have prosecuted them before their own courts, apparently for
crimes against humanity or for breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
Trials by either the International Tribunals created for Yugoslavia
and Rwanda or by national tribunal appear to ignore a major legal
problem, namely that of classification of the conflict. In accordance
with black letter law, war crimes can only be committed during an
international armed conflict. The tribunal established by the United
Nations for offenses in the former Yugoslavia may well be faced with
offenses committed both during an international and a non-international conflict. It is true that the competence of the Tribunal expressly
includes grave breaches of the Conventions - this also embraces Protocol I, since this is now annexed to the Conventions - as well as
offenses against the laws and customs of war. However, the Statute
does not refer to war crimes per se; as indicated above, the grave
breaches are in fact offenses against international humanitarian law,
while "serious" war crimes would almost certainly amount to crimes
against humanity. It would be wise, therefore, for the Tribunal to
avoid using the term "war crime" except when judging an accused from
the forces of an independent state such as Bosnia, Serbia, or Croatia
fighting against one or other of these entities. When the accused is, for
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example, a Bosnian or Croatian Serb involved in an attempt to overthrow the government of Bosnia, this term should be scrupulously
avoided. What is true of the International Tribunal is equally true of
national tribunals charging persons with similar offences. As to the
Rwanda tribunal, no basis exists to consider the conflict therein as
anything but a non-international conflict, regardless of the language
used to describe the offenses of any person charged. As regards trials
instituted in Rwanda or Ethiopia by local courts, these do not relate to
war crimes (though they may be crimes against humanity) even if they
are really primarily concerned with wreaking vengeance upon political
opponents.
Despite the legal problems herein outlined, the major significance
of the establishment of the International Tribunals and the institution
of proceedings by "neutral" countries is the development in the name of
humanity extending to non-international armed conflicts the same sort
of preventive protection - for the aim of such trials is to warn potential offenders and thus hopefully to prevent breaches - which has long
existed with regard to international armed conflicts. Since it is important to avoid criticism of such developments on the basis of specious or
even substantial legal arguments, it would be preferable if, in any of
these doubtful conflicts, the procedure is based on the provisions of
international humanitarian law and recognition of the fact that
breaches of this law amount to crimes against humanity. Should the
International Law Commission's proposals for the establishment of a
permanent International Criminal Court come to fruition, many of
these problems will disappear, especially as the listing of crimes includes grave breaches, crimes against humanity, and serious war
crimes. Moreover, a permanent court will be in existence with a permanent panel of judges, with the jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and
Rwanda tribunals to assist it.
To return to Wright - if we are to seek to prevent war (especially
of the non-international kind) in which ideological or ethnic hatreds
are responsible for atrocities usually more grievous than those in an
international conflict, perhaps it is time to find some way of avoiding
debate as to the legality of Council action in dealing with this type of
situation. It might be apt, during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations
of the United Nations, for some middle power to propose in the General Assembly some resolution along such lines as the following:
When a state, whether a member of the United Nations or not,
because of internal disturbance or complete breakdown of the administration, is no longer able to govern the state by maintaining
peace and good order, with the result that it is unable or unwilling
to protect the basic human rights of identifiable groups among the
population, or itself threatens those rights in a gross and inhumane
manner, the United Nations should then recognize that fact and
assume to itself the power to take over the administration of that
state until such time as a new indigenous administrative authority
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is able to undertake the task of government in a peaceful and humane fashion. The persons chosen to constitute the interim administration should be selected from groups trained for this task in a
United Nation institution specially established for this purpose,
and, to the greatest extent possible, should not be drawn from
among nationals of any of the permanent members of the Security
Council. In their training, care should be taken to ensure that they
are made fully aware of the history, customs, culture, ethic, and
prejudices of the inhabitants of the state in question.

